Virginia Political Economy and Entrepreneurship with Diana Thomas

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In this episode, Diana Thomas discusses the relationship between the Virginia School of Political Economy and the Austrian School of Economics. Diana is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Heider College of Business at Creighton University.

The Virginia School is a branch of public choice, the application of the tools and techniques of economics to the study of political actors. The Virginia School’s founders, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, were the first to systematically apply a rational choice framework to the study of politics in The Calculus of Consent.

Two assumptions commonly made by neoclassical economists are the “benevolence assumption” and the “omniscience assumption.” The benevolence assumption is implicit in normative analysis of what governments “ought” to do, as this assumes that political actors are motivated to maximize the common good rather than pursuing their self-interest. This assumption is challenged by public choice economists. The omniscience assumption is at play in economic models that depict the economy as being in equilibrium, whereby nobody is misinformed of or surprised by economic reality. This assumption is challenged by Austrian economists.

The omniscience assumption implies that the economy should be possible to rationally plan, an idea that Mises and Hayek debunked in the socialist calculation debate of the 1920s and 30s.

As Diana states in her paper, Entrepreneurship: Catallactic and Constitutional Perspectives, “both Buchanan and Tullock reference Mises’ Human Action as the central reference for their understanding of methodological individualism.” The Virginia and Austrian schools also share common understandings of rationality and of self-interest.

Diana draws a parallel between Israel Kirzner’s distinction between calculative and entrepreneurial action and Buchanan’s distinction between reactive and creative action. While calculative or reactive action consists in simply responding to known incentives and constraints, entrepreneurial or creative action consists in envisioning a future that is different from the present and in acting on that expectation. Kirzner applies the concept of entrepreneurship to businessmen seizing anticipated arbitrage opportunities in the market. Buchanan applies the concept of creative action to political actors attempting to reform constitutional rules.

Buchanan conceives of constitutional rules as being made behind a “veil of uncertainty” since it is beyond political actors’ ability to predict in precisely what situations the rule will be applied, and whether their own self-interest will be served or hurt in those situations.

Diana believes that political action is more entrepreneurial than most economists recognize.  But while market entrepreneurship is guided by profit and loss towards those processes that best serve consumers, political entrepreneurship has no such guiding principle. Political entrepreneurs may innovate in ways that actually harm their constituents, but these innovations may nonetheless thrive and endure.

Poll numbers and bad press can motivate political actors, but these signals may not conform to the actual impacts of the policy. Good policies are often derided as evil, while bad policies are often popular. A US President can boost his popularity by declaring war, but US military ventures have a terrible track record in terms of their ultimate consequences (see Chris Coyne’s After War). Market innovations such as Lyft and Uber clearly benefit consumers, and yet there has been a political backlash against these popular businesses.

Public choice economists recognize that voters are “rationally ignorant,” since becoming informed about issues is costly, while the benefit is only manifested in better policy if the specific voter happens to be the swing vote in an otherwise tied election. Given these incentives, it would be irrational to be informed about policy, so it’s surprising that so many people vote at all. Diana explains it in terms of “expressive voting.” Voters vote because they want to express their views, not because their vote is particularly potent in shaping political outcomes.

Diana argues that policies aren’t particularly strongly affected by who is elected to office, rather they stem from institutional incentives. The median voter theorem demonstrates how, under plausible conditions, politicians attempt to please the most people by converging to a centrist policy. Another theory says that policy is not directed primarily by elections but by the lobbying efforts of special interest groups (see Olson). Since these groups get concentrated benefits from preferential policies, they have a strong incentive to agitate for them. Those who pay the costs of these policies (usually consumers) have only a small incentive to agitate against them, as the costs are dispersed among a great number of individuals.

Specific examples of policies made for the benefit of concentrated special interests are the US sugar quota, and Canadian customs duties charged for the importation of dairy products (leading to absurd cases of cheese smuggling).

You can read more from Diana Thomas at her professional website.

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Virginia Political Economy and Entrepreneurship with Diana Thomas

In this episode, Diana Thomas discusses the relationship between the Virginia School of Political Economy and the Austrian School of Economics. Diana is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Heider College of Business at Creighton University.

The Virginia School is a branch of public choice, the application of the tools and techniques of economics to the study of political actors. The Virginia School’s founders, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, were the first to systematically apply a rational choice framework to the study of politics in The Calculus of Consent.

Two assumptions commonly made by neoclassical economists are the “benevolence assumption” and the “omniscience assumption.” The benevolence assumption is implicit in normative analysis of what governments “ought” to do, as this assumes that political actors are motivated to maximize the common good rather than pursuing their self-interest. This assumption is challenged by public choice economists. The omniscience assumption is at play in economic models that depict the economy as being in equilibrium, whereby nobody is misinformed of or surprised by economic reality. This assumption is challenged by Austrian economists. (more…)

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Radicalism and the Political Landscape

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Last night I had a nice conversation with some other Queen’s economics alumni. When the conversation turned to politics, I said that I didn’t want to follow the next election and that I had promised myself I wouldn’t support the lesser evil. I may have come off as apathetic about politics, but that was not my intention.

The way I see it, there is a tradeoff between having a small (i.e. negligible) influence on present politics, by volunteering for political parties, talking (or blogging) about current political issues, and of course voting, and having a potentially larger influence on future politics. Here is the opening paragraph of Hayek’s essay, The Intellectuals and Socialism:

In all democratic countries, in the United States even more than elsewhere, a strong belief prevails that the influence of the intellectuals on politics is negligible. This is no doubt true of the power of intellectuals to make their peculiar opinions of the
moment influence decisions, of the extent to which they can sway the popular vote on questions on which they differ from the current views of the masses. Yet over somewhat longer periods they have probably never exercised so great an influence as they do today in those countries. This power they wield by shaping public opinion.

Hayek’s view, which I share, is that there is a fundamentally different mechanism at play in short-run politics and in long-run politics: The short run turns on popular opinion, while the long run turns on the forces that shape popular opinion.

Short-run politics is mostly characterized by a competition between very similar alternatives. The differences between politicians and parties often come down to the particular personal characteristics of the individuals and to differences in emphasis on basically similar platforms.  The fact that under a Democratic administration Rush Limbaugh is criticizing the state and Bill Maher is apologizing for it, and under a Republican administration Limbaugh and Maher reverse roles, has more to do with the perceived differences between Republican and Democrat than the actual differences in policy. Limbaugh and Maher focus on different things to complain about and apologize for, so we hear about different things depending on who is doing the complaining and who is doing the apologizing.

Politicians and political parties play to people’s beliefs, but people’s beliefs are shaped, in the long run, by the ideas and information they absorb largely from the intellectual class. This is where the tradeoff I mentioned before, between having a small influence on present politics and having a potentially larger influence on future politics, comes into play. Participating in present politics means communicating to people within the context of their preexisting beliefs.  This means sacrificing the opportunity to plant the seeds of a fundamental change in those underlying beliefs.

For example, I favour open borders. I could hold my nose and speak out for the present politician who I think might loosen migration restrictions ever so slightly. Alternatively, I and my fellow open borders radicals could give that politician the criticism he deserves. If we could force the “slightly less closed border” crowd to address our concerns, they would have to speak out in defense of migration restrictions. That would mean relinquishing the appearance of being pro-immigrant and the moral high ground that goes with it. In a few decades, the entire context of the debate could shift in the direction of open borders.

The entire libertarian movement has pursued a very successful strategy of political irrelevance in recent years. Libertarians don’t form a large enough voting block to enact any of their preferred policies, but they have forced mainstream pundits to address them. It seems like a new article about how crazy and wrong libertarians are comes out every day. As the saying goes, “First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.” Ordinary people now know what a libertarian is and can ask themselves, “Am I a libertarian?” Even if the answer is no, that’s a huge improvement over total ignorance of libertarian concerns.

I favour the long run strategy in politics. It allows for a single individual to have significant influence. If I talk three people into radicalism, and they each talk three people into radicalism, and each radical shifts the views of five moderates, it doesn’t take very many iterations to dramatically change the political landscape. Those iterations take time, so the further in the future you look, the greater the influence of a successful radical.

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