Political Change with Ed Lopez

Today’s guest is Edward J. Lopez of Western Carolina University. We discuss his book, Madmen, Intellectuals, and Academic Scribblers: The Economic Engine of Political Change, which was co-authored with Wayne Leighton.

Does major political reform require a crisis? When do new ideas emerge in politics? How can one person make a difference?

In short: how and when does political change happen? Madmen, Intellectuals, and Academic Scribblers tackles these big questions, arguing that ideas and entrepreneurship are the key ingredients in any episode of political change. Authors Wayne A. Leighton and Edward J. López begin with the first lesson in economics — incentives matter — and artfully explain how the lesson applies throughout political life. Incentives explain why democracies often generate policies that impose net costs on society, and why these inefficient policies persist for years.

Yet beneficial reform does sometimes occur. So Madmen goes beyond incentives to offer a framework in which political change channels its way from ideas in society, through society’s shared institutions (i.e., its rules of the game) , which in turn shape incentives. This type of change is seldom easy, because new ideas for shaping the rules of the game must overcome two forces in society: widely shared beliefs and powerfully vested interests. Yet at certain political moments – perhaps during a crisis, but not always – shared beliefs and vested interests begin to weaken, and the opportunity for reform emerges. Within this framework, Madmen shows why certain inefficient policies eventually get repealed (e.g., airline rate and route regulation), while others endure (e.g., sugar subsidies and tariffs).


Links

In the course of the conversation, Ed mentions Thomas Hazlett’s work on the radio spectrum and Tina Rosenberg’s discussion of Iranian kidney markets on Econtalk.

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Markets for Rebellion with Vincent Geloso

Vincent Geloso returns to the podcast today to discuss his paper, “Markets for Rebellions? The Rebellions of 1837-38 in Lower Canada”. The paper discusses the idea that political upheaval and even violent rebellion can be more likely in areas with a high degree of market access.

In 1837-38, the British colonies of Upper and Lower Canada rebelled. The rebellion was most virulent in the latter of the two colonies. Historians have argued that economic consideration were marginal in explaining the causes of the rebellions. To make this claim, they argue that the areas that rebelled in Lower Canada were among the richest in the colony, and the least likely to be motivated by economic factors. In this paper, we use the census of 1831 and databases of rebellious events to question this claim. We argue that the rich areas were more prone to rebellion because they were where markets were most developed. These well-developed markets allowed for cheaper coordination of seditious elements while also increasing the wealth (i.e. the rent) over which to fight.


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Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan with Jennifer Murtazashvili

By Staff Sgt. Russell Lee Klika, US Army National Guard

Tooday’s guest is Jennifer Murtazashvili of the University of Pittsburgh. We discuss her book, Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan.

Despite vast efforts to build the state, profound political order in rural Afghanistan is maintained by self-governing, customary organizations. Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan explores the rules governing these organizations to explain why they can provide public goods. Instead of withering during decades of conflict, customary authority adapted to become more responsive and deliberative. Drawing on hundreds of interviews and observations from dozens of villages across Afghanistan, and statistical analysis of nationally representative surveys, Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili demonstrates that such authority enhances citizen support for democracy, enabling the rule of law by providing citizens with a bulwark of defence against predatory state officials. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it shows that ‘traditional’ order does not impede the development of the state because even the most independent-minded communities see a need for a central government – but question its effectiveness when it attempts to rule them directly and without substantive consultation.

Our conversation dives deep into the modern history of Afghanistan, including its 1978 communist revolution and subsequent Soviet invasion.


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